报告题目：Preference Alignment and Optimal Sender Ordering in Sequential Bayesian Persuasion

报告人⬅️：荣康（上海财经大学）

报告时间：2024年5月22日（星期三）上午10:30-11:45

报告地点：杏鑫娱乐官网大楼210

邀请部门：经济学系

报告人简介：

荣康，上海财经大学常任副教授。研究领域包括博弈论、机制设计和信息设计。研究工作发表于Journal of Economic Theory🤛🏻、International Economic Review、Games and Economic Behavior、Economic Theory♌️、Journal of Mathematical Economics等国际知名经济学期刊🤽🏻🥧。

报告摘要：

This paper studies the impact of the order of senders in the sequential Bayesian persuasion game on the receiver's equilibrium utility. We find that when senders can be ranked in terms of alignment with the receiver, it is always optimal for the receiver to put the more aligned sender before the less aligned sender. Comparative statics analysis shows that when we restrict to senders who are alignable, as the degree of misalignment between senders increases or as the number of senders increases, the receiver's equilibrium utility may decrease. In addition, we find that when senders are alignable, the sequential game performs no worse than the simultaneous game in terms of information disclosure.